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THE SERRANO EQUALIZATION PRINCIPLE: ITS IMPACT ON
CITY PLANNING$ LAND VALUES Aim USE
Donald G. Hagman*

I.

The Serrano Principle

On August 30, 1971, in Serrano v. Priest>

1

the California Supreme

Court held the California school finance system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Public schools in California, as in many states, are sub-

stantially financed by a local property tax.

But the ratio of the

property tax base to the number of pupils within various school districts of the state is not the same.

As a result, some school districts

are able to spend large sums of money per pupil though tax rates are
very low.

Other school districts, despite high tax rat-:;s, are able to

spend relatively little per pupil.

The Serrano principle

11

[p]lainly

put • • • is that the level of spending . . . may not be a function of
wealth other than the ivealth of the state as a whole." 2
Made bold by the California decision, courts throughout the country
began applying the Serrano principle.

The Minnesota school finance

system was held invalid on October 12, 3 Wyoming's on December 14,

4

Texas' on December 23. 5 The judicial juggernaut opened the Ne-vr Year by
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invalidating school finance systems in Arizona on January 13

6

and in

New Jersey on January 19. 7

But the next day, a New· York court refused
8
to hold that state 1 s system of school finance to be unconstitutional.
The New York system does not differ essentially from that in the other
states.

The New York ,iudge merely disagreed that any such system was

unconstitutional.
One wonders about the state of mind of the trial juqge in New York,
sitting in "1-lestchester County, by repute a
suburban area of Ne-vr York City.

11

silk-stock:i,.ng". residential

One would expect that expenditures per

pupil were relatively high and the tax burdens relatively low in Westchester.

Was the judge's attitude in part shaped by those of the consti-

tuents who elect him?

Did the judge realize that his decision was neces-

sary to reverse a principle that if unleashed might be the beginning of
the end of the Westchester way of life?

Perhaps so, for the Serrano

principle carries redistribution of wealth seeds of destructiveness to
Westchester-like ways of life.
We will soon know whether the New York judge, who calls .the Serrano
thesis the

11

one scholar, one dollar" principle, rightly concluded that

similar U. S. Supreme Court cases 9 are precedent for upholding the
validity of school finance systems.

An appeal from the Texas decision

was filed with the Court on April 17, 1972.

II.

10

Acceptance of the Principle

For the Serrano principle to truly have impact on the nation, the
U. S. Supreme Court must uphold it, and the Court has not noticeably
sided with social change in recent years.

But the principle is not

-3dead even if the Court concludes Serrano is incorrectly decided.

States

have their own constitutions, and present financing schemes might violate state constitutions, as held in the California, New Jersey and
Texas decisions.
Moreover, by the time the U. S. Supreme Court decides the question,
the principle might be rampant in the nation in any event--not necessarily because it is constitutionally required, but because it is right.
.
11
The inequality in school finance has long been regarded as scandalous;
declaring it unconstitutional merely provides the stimulus for state
legislatures to break through the status quo.

Thus, the California

legislature has several Serrano-responsive proposals before it, though
technically it need not yet respond. 12 The Minnesota legislature has
already acted. 13

In its massive study on school finance in New York,

the Fleischmann Commission, reporting after both the Serrano and the
New York case, made recommendations consistent with the Serrano
principle.

14

The President's Commission on School Finance has made

recomme~dations supporting the Serrano principle. 15 The President's
proposed $2.5 billion Educational Opportunities Act of 1972 evidences a
view coincident with Serrano.

16

In light of its previous pronouncements

on the matter, 17 it is a virtual certainty that when the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations

18

reports to the President on school

finance, its recommendations will applaud Serrano principles.
And one does not avoid the thrust of the Serrano principle by
substituting other local taxes.

While Serrano-like cases deal only

with property taxes, that is because local taxes for schools have invari.

.

ably been property taxes.

~

If a local sales tax or a local income tax

was used to finance schools, these would likely also be reflective of

-4the wealth of the area and be violative of the Serrano principle.
It is therefore highly probable that regardless of what the U. S.
Supreme Court does, the

Ser~

principle will be widely applied to

school financing in America, and shifting to other taxes reflective of
local wealth will not satisfy the principle.

III.

Possible Extensions of the Principle

The impact on city planning and property values and uses shortly
to be described will be more massive if the Serrano principle is extended
in two possible directions.

The two extensions would produce widespread

and massive social change not often precedented in America.
Judicial decisions that the quality of all local government services
must be unchained from the local wealth base is one possible extension.
That possibility will be a major topic of discussion at the annual meeting of the Local Government Section of the American Bar Association in
August, 1972.

Meanwhile, it appears that the first lawsuit attempting

to extend Serrano to other local government entities was filed in
California.
lawsuit

20

The trial judge has overruled defendant's demurrer in the

and the matter will now go on to trial.

Extension of the

Serrano principle to all local governments would have more massive
impact on American planning, land values and uses for several reasons:
1.

Revenues and expenditures of local governments in America other

than school districts are one and one-half times those of school

. t r1c
. t s. 21
d1s
2.

More than property taxes are involved because local governments

other than school districts have substantial alternative revenues. 22

3.

The inequalities in revenues and services among local govern-

ments other than school districts &re far more pronounced than among
school districts. 23

4.

Local governments other than school districts control the urban

planning system which is frequently responsive to fiscal pressures.
The second possible extension of Serrano is to measure equality
not by equal expenditures, but by need.

Obviously, in order to maintain

a certain standard of governmental service, educational or otherwise,
expenditures must be greater in some areas than others because costs are
higher.

But Serrano does not address itself to needs.

That argument was

rejected in another case where plaintiffs alleged. "only a financing
system which apportions public funds according to the educational needs
of the students satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment."

24

A major reason

for rejecting the argument was that needs are very difficult to measure.
If the court could be shown a -vray to measure needs, perhaps the result
would be different.
And a little judicial recognition of the needs

ar~~ent

would go

a long way to stimulate a breakthrough to better equalization measured
by need because that too is regarded as right 25 even though we have
not yet come to recognize such inequalities as unconstitutional.

State

equalization aid to schools has always recognized need and the responses
to Serrano will invariably go beyond strict equality of burden and
expenditures and recognize need.

In England, which is already some

hundred years ahead of America in equalization of all local government
revenues and expenditures, the Conservative government has proposed to
distribute grants "in such a way that the cost for each local authority
of providing a standard level of'service [measured by need] should be a

-6,26
standard amount per head. ··

IV.

Impact of the Principle

There follow some speculations as to the impacts of the Serrano
principle.

That

the impacts will be as alleged is based on conventional

wisdom and hunch rather than on empirical research.

For purposes of

the speculation, assume that the Serrano principle is extended to the
possibilities previously outlined.

To the extent it is not extended,

many of the impacts will still occur, but the effect will not be as
extensive.
The price of real estate on the "right side of the tracks" •·rill
decrease in value, while it will increase on the "wrong side of the
tracks. 11

Consider Weal thyville and Poorville, two aptly named hypo-

thetical cities in a metropolitan area.

vJealthyville is a typical high-

quality public services, low tax burden community; Poorville is the
converse.

Real estate values in both cities are in part determined by

the quality of public services received and the burden of property
taxes.

Therefore, prior to application of Serrano principles, market

prices for homes in Wealthyville were higher than they were in Poorville,
where services were poor and property tax burdens were high.
Post

Serrano~ however~

services must be of equal quality and bur-

dens must be equalized among the t1vo cities.

If the expenditures and

burdens are merely redistributed without any change in the amount of
expenditures and burdens, suburban Wealthyville will receive poorer
services at higher cost, so market values will drop.

Poorville, con-

versely, will receive better services at lower cost, so property values

-7will increase.
It may be, of course, that the people in Wealthyville will not
accept lower quality services.
from the private sector.

One alternative is to purchase services

But such additional payments, just as an

increase in property tax burdens, would tend to lower values of property
in Wealthyville. 27
Greater socio-economic housing integration will result.

There is

presently considerable wealth and race segregation in housing in most
areas of America.

If one is both poor and of a minority

race~

it is

likely that he lives in a neighborhood limited to others who are poor
and members of a minority race.

But Americans move frequently for a

variety of purposes, and post Serrano greater socio-economic integration
could occur.

To return to our Wealthyville and Poorville examples,

post Serrano the people in Poorville should be able to acquire homes in
Wealthyville at a lesser price with no greater tax burden than in Poorville.

Some might choose to do so.

Conversely, people in Wealthyville

may find that with the higher level of services and lower tax burdens
than previously in Poorville, Poorville has become an acceptable place to
live.

Ultimately, such housing integration is a far more cost-effective

answer to educational integration than massive busing.
Low-income housing will be more readily accepted.

Cities now use

every technique that can be devised by man to exclude low-income housing.
Often the exclusion is racially motivated.

On the other hand, it is

also municipal madness to willingly accept low-income housing when, as
is so, it adds yery little to the tax base and requires very high service
costs.

To do a good job at providing low-income housing now invites

inundation by the poor from the region.

Not only is low-income housing

28

-8excluded, but through urban renewal, freeway building

progr~~s

and the

like, low-income housing is removed, often with no replacement housing
being fUrnished.

Post Serrano, there will be little fiscal pressure to

exclude or remove low-income housing. 29

The state must adjust its sys-

tem so that the low-income housing can be provided. with quality services
without imposing such high tax burdens on the community accepting the
housing.
More new

hous~ng

starts in central cities.

There are, of course,

many reasons for the phenomenon that much land in central cities and
older urban communities lies passed-over, underutilized and vacant
while land on the suburban fringes is developed with new housing.
haps the Serrano principle will help reverse that phenomenon.

Per-

Every-

thing else being equal, investors in housing will invest where property
tax rates are lower. 30

And property tax rates are generally higher in

the central cities. 31
Business and industry will not as readily leave the central cities.
In many metropolitan areas, business and industry is relocating in the
suburbs.

In thirty-nine major metropolitan areas of the country, 85 per-

cent of all industrial and commercial growth, measured by jobs, has taken
place in the suburbs.

In New Jersey the rate has been 95 percent. 32

There are a number of reasons for such moves, but tax burdens are a
factor. 33

In New Jersey, for example, tax rates for schools in five

central cities were $2.57 to $3.69.
varied from $1.16 to $2.05. 34

In nine suburban cities the rates

If tax burdens are equalized, business

and industry will have one less reason for moving--two less reasons
when services provided in the central cities are also improved because
of greater fiscal ability to provide services.

-9Central cities will resume population growth.

Central cities are

declining in population relative to the population of the suburbs. 35
The reasons for this increasing imbalance are many. 36

But among the

reasons offered is the desire to obtain higher quality public services
of a desired sort with lower tax burdens. 37
to provide such advantages.
ever, the quality of
wealth.

pu~lic

Suburbs are frequently able

If the Serrano principle is applied, howservices cannot be dependent on local

If such a principle means that a given tax effort must produce

sufficient revenues to permit equal expenditures per capita, then
suburbs may still retain the capacity to provide a comparatively favorable
environment in some metropolitan areas, for to produce an environment
of suburban quality in central cities might take more than equal
expenditures per capita vis-a-vis suburbia.

The suburban growth might

well continue if the only advantage suburbia loses is that of the lower
tax burden.

However, if the test for equality of services comes to be

measured by need rather than by equality in expenditures per capita,
the overall quality of life in the central cities should be equal to that
in suburbia, insofar as local public services can produce it.

Suburbia

will therefore lose some of its relative advantages and central cities
should show greater growth than now relative to suburban
Overzoning will be reduced.

gro~~h.

While tax exemptions to industrial

developers are confined to limited areas of the country, 38 it is no
secret that many municipalities compete in a variety of legal, marginally
legal and illegal ways to .attract tax base, e.g., through industrial
development.

That same motive, when added to typical landowner pressure

to have land zoned for the most intensive land use possible, leads to a
common defect of zoning ordinances:

-103. Excessive areas or frontages are zoned for the more
intensive uses . . . in relation either to: (1) the
effective demand for such space, or to (2) the capacity
of the streets and utility systems available to serve
such districts, 39
Of course, if the gross overzoning of land for intensive industrial or
commercial use does not provide a prospective developer with every
imaginable option for location within an area, the city is often more
than eager to rezone wherever desired, thus disrupting its planning.
Overzoning creates a situation where the zoning and the demand for land
as zoned are not reasonably related to one another.

As a result, land

may be unutilized or underutilized as it is unduly held off the market.
Intensively zoned land may become lower priced, encouraging disruption
by less intensive uses.

Generally, overzoning makes it less possible

for planning to shape development.
Post Serrano, hmvever, the need to encourage development of industrial and co:rr,mercial areas to provide tax base ;;dll not be as great.
Consequently, to the extent overzoning is caused by the need to attract
tax base, the pressures for overzoning can be reduced.
Local government revenue demands and expenditures will decrease.
Local government expenditures have been an increasing share of Gross
National Product.

In 1969, local government expenditures were 5.96

percent of GNP while in 1950 they were 4.38 percent.

40

Post Serrano,

it will be more costly to use local government to preserve islands of
privilege.

And the Serrano principle can partially be avoided if, for

example, the people in Wealthyville purchase more government-like
services from the private sector.

Thus, as has been the case where

schools were racially integrated or the level of services rendered by
public schools was lowered, many affluent parents send their children

-11-

to private schools.

Such practices dilute the underlying social

change intended by Serrano, namely, that the quality of schooling
should not so much depend on 1-real th.

Horeover, those persons who pur-

chase their services privately tend to become a constituency against
rather than for high-quality public services, so that their tax plus
private service purchase burdens can be reduced.
Annexations and exclusions need not be tax motivated.

In an ideal

system, political boundary lines of local governments might be set to
conform to socio-economic geography.

But under the system practiced in

most American states, municipal growth

b~

annexation or non-growth by

refusal to annex, is often motivated by considerations of tax and
services burden.

As a Texas report points out:

No.doubt one of the major causes of annexation activity and,
unfortunately of annexation abuse, is intercity competition.
It would seem that municipal competition has forced cities
to grab huge blocks of land to protect their industries,
assure future tax revenues • . • • 41
As a result of' the intercity competition, areas are annexed solely
because they contain a facility providing large tax base, such as a
major industrial plant.

But it might make much better sense for the

plant to be in another local government.

Often, in order to annex, it

is not possible to annex only the tax base, but intervening territory
best left outside the limits of' the annexing local government must also
be annexed to meet typical contiguity requirements.

Thus, lands not

appropriately included might be added or boundary lines might be erratic
and gerrymandered.

Both situations may make it difficult and more

costly to provide public services both to territory annexed and to that
left out.

42
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On the other hand, areas definitely urban and residential and
needing the kind of services which could be provided by annexation are
l,".:l

often denied annexation or even excluded ~ because of high service
4

costs.

For example, no city is eager to annex a low-income housing

project.
Post Serrano, much of the tax-service burden need either to annex,
to deny annexation or to exclude will be removed.

Political 'and plan-

ning considerations more than fiscal considerations can determine
what areas should be within what local governments.
Fiscal inducements to governmental fragmentation by incorporation
of cities wili be reduced.

Cities are incorporated for a variety of

reasons, but many have been incorporated for fiscal reasons, to provide
tax havens variously for residence, industry, commerce and agriculture.
For example, by minimizing the amount of residential property in the
city, property taxes on business ventures can be kept relatively low.
Because of sales tax laws, as in California and Illinois, which provide
for a local tax or a state tax returned to the local government within
which the sale took place, some cities are incorporated that specialize
in retail businesses.

Such cities finance themselves not on their ovrn

wealth but on the wealth of persons living in other cities--perhaps a
double violation of the Serrano principle.

In states such as Wisconsin,

where a portion of the individual income tax is returned to the local
government wherein the taxpayer resides, cities of residential elitism
have been formed.

By using land use practices vhich permit only the

wealthy elite to live there, the return from the income tax may be
sufficient to eliminate any city property tax, and the quality of public
services can still be high.

-13Because of such fiscally motivated incorporations, other local
governments in the same socio-economic region, with barely minimal
services and desperate for tax base, have skyrocketing tax burdens because
the wealth of the region has been captured by these kinds of near-private
purpose uses of public government.

Post Serrano, when burdens and

services must be more equalized, the reason for such havens will cease
to exist.

The fiscal inducement for the incorporation of further such

local governments will be removed.
Reduction in local government.

fra~entation.

Coherent planning is

a virtual impossibility in socio-economic regions that are split geographically and functionally by many governmental entities.
districts are

numeric~lly

government in America;

Special

the most rapidly increasing form of local

44 and they are a double anathema, for they cause

both functional and geographical

frar~entation

at the same time.

Most

studies of special districts have concluded that they are marginally
desirable and that general-purpose local governments are preferable in
all but rare instances. 45
Yet special districts must often be formed because general-purpose
governments are financially unable to provide required services because
they have reached their tax or debt limits.

~fuile

such limits might be

rationally set considering all local governments as a whole, there is
an uneven spread of tax base and uneven demand for services among different localities in the state.
By forming new local governments, debt and tax limits imposed on
local government already existing in the area are generally avoided.
The new local governments can then provide the needed services.

46

But

burdens .are not reduced, they are merely imposed by a different type of

-14local government.

And the local government utilized, typically a

special district, is not the sort needed.

In high-service-demand areas

with high population densities and likely a nuJnber of local government
entities already operative, an entity is needed that has a vride range of
powers, managed in a way which can apply resources on a priority basis
and coordinate problem solving.

Special districts, on the other hand,

"do their oWn thing 11 vTi thout regard to overall needs.

Thus, the people

in the area pay too much to receive services that do not meet their
priority needs.
While Serrano does nothing directly about tax limits and debt
limits, Serrano found tax rates constitutionally invalid because the
higher rates meant greater burdens without a commensurate increase in
services.

Since most tax limits are expressed in terms of rates per

assessed valuation, 47 an averaging-out of rates should give generalpurpose governments more breathing room between their tax rates and
their tax limits, thus removing one reasori for fragmenting an area into
special districts.
Regionalism and regional cooperation will be promoted.
[A consequence of fiscal fragmentation] is the'incentive which
each local government has to take actions to improve its mm
tax base at the expense of its neighbors. Fiscal fragmentation has the effect of discouraging intergovernmental cooperation in the Twin Cities area. This in turn results in actions
which work against the benefit of the entire area. 48
So reads the introduction to the Report which led.to the innovative taxsharing plan now in effect in the Twin Cities metropolitan area in
Minnesota.

49 Under the plan, new tax base in one governmental area is

shared as part of the tax base of the region.

The point made in the

Report and made frequently elsewhere 50 is that regional planning and

-15-

regional cooperation in America is a virtual impossibility when disparities in fiscal capacity make each local government compete vigorously and of necessity to preserve its own tax base.

Despite anti-

trust laws, it sometimes appears there is more cooperation between
General Hotors and Ford than there is beh1een units of local government
•rithin metropolitan regions.
The Serrano principle, on the other hand, operates to make the
entire state a fiscal region, thus making it possible for considerations
of socio-economic geography rather than fiscal considerations to govern
regional planning and cooperation.

The very definition of a region is

an area with an essentially unitary socio-economic geography.

Once

fiscal considerations are removed, local political units are free to
act in a way which fosters natural socio-economic geography.

Unfortu-

nately, the Serrano principle is not judicially applied to require an
equalization of burdens and expenditures betvreen the parts of regions
lying in more than one state. 51

And perhaps it would be better if the

burdens and expenditures were equalized within regions rather than
2
within states. 5· But in implementing the Serrano principle, the federal
and state legislatures can make equalization adjustments that go beyond
constitutional and judge-ordered requirements.

On the whole, the

Serrano principle is a massive step forward in the direction of eliminating excessive localism.
Decentralization will be financially feasible.
Black student:
Hagman:

11

"We would like to incorporate Watts as a separate city."

Where tvill you get the money to provide city services? 11

Black student :

"We '11 get it from our brothers in Bald·win
Hills." 53

-16Such a conversation was the stimulus for an article 54 outlining
a fiscally feasible way of permitting decentralization of government.
Decentralization is not the same as fragmentation.
rationally, the latter just happens.

The former is done

But decentralization is not feasible

for poor, minority populations when any governmental entity formed has
relatively little tax base and, likely, relatively high service demands.
Thus, whatever is good about such concepts as home rule, neighborhood
government, local control, self-determination and the like, which have
produced suburban America, has been denied to large segments of the
population who frequently live in large cities, represented by governments run by other than their kind.
Post Serrano such persons could also enjoy the advantages of
decentralized government. 55

If a place like Watts were to become a

separate local government rather than a place name for an area of the
larger

city~

the Serrano principle would require adequate funding.

The quality of services could not be dependent on the wealth of the
community.
Egualized state general revenue sharing will be stimulated.

The

Serrano principle is that the quality of services cannot be dependent
on the wealth of the area.

The principle calls for some centralized

public finance by the state to make up for local tax wealth inequities.
If centralized control flowed from centralized finance, the court would
likely have been persuaded that there was a compelling state interest
in continuing the present inequitable system of school finance.

Instead,

the Serrano court specifically rejected the argument that centralized
finance means loss of local control.

As a result, formulas for increas-

ing state aid to the schools in response to Serrano are likely to be

-17general-purpose, no "strings, 11 rather than special-purpose, with
"strings," grants.

That will be no revolution, for in 1966-67, 84.7

percent 56 of state grants to school districts were for general purposes-general revenue sharing.
Serrano also requires equalization of aid.

Obviously, if the

state replaces local wealth with state wealth in a way which leaves
school districts with current disparities in expenditures, the Serrano
principle would not be met.

Here again 9 state grants to schools

have accepted the principle of equalization.

In 1966-67, 69.2 percent 57

of state grants to schools used some type of equalizing factor.

Their

inadequacy under Serrano is that they were not equalizing enough.
But if the Serrano principle is extended to other public services,
the change would be of near-revolutionary dimensions.

First, state aid

for non-educational functions is only 38 percent of total state aid. 58
Second, local governments other than schools rely much more on their own
sources, 59 disparities in wealth are as great or greater,
ture levels are more unequal. 61

60

so expendi-

Third, the aid that is available is

hardly ever paid under ru1 equalization formula. 62

Richer communities

may well tend to get richer as a result of state aid. 63
more of the aid is categorical (special purpose).

Finally, much

Thus, vThile most

school aid can be used for any purpose by the school district (assuming
certain state minimums are met), general-purpose local governments
(cities and counties) receive aid for such special functions as welfare,
health and highways.

High1-ray aid cannot be used to provide fire pro-

tection, for example, though both are provided by the same generalpurpose government.

No "strings" general aid to general-purpose local

governments is a very small portion of local general revenue--some 2.7

-18percent in 1967.

64 Thus, after full application of the Serrano

principle, the system of aid to general-purpose local governments
will likely be shifted from one of relatively small amounts of aid,
unequalized and categorical, to much more significant amounts of aid,
equalized and general.

The change would be in the same direction as but

be far more radical than Serrano-caused responses in educational
finance and would tend to create a state system of equalized general
revenue sharing.
The responsibility for funding tax exemptions will be shifted to
the state.

One of the reasons that tax base is unequally distributed

is that tax exemptions are unequally distributed.
clearly evidenced by property tax exemptions.

The matter is most

Suppose city A is a

governmental, church, medical, cultural and educational center with
much tax exempt property.
property is $5 billion.

The total market value of all of its real
City B also has real property with a $5 billion

real property valuation, but it is an industrial center.

Because of

exemptions, the taxable wealth of City A might be $2.5 billion. 65

The

service demands on City A might ,.,ell be equivalent to those in City B.
So if the property tax were the sole source of revenue in both cities,
the tax rate in City A would be twice that in City B.

The Serrano

principle does not allow such a disparity.
Presently, the problem of tax exemption is largely a local one.
The state legislatures,disinclined to provide direct subsidies, provide
indirect subsidies through tax exemption.

66
.
. 1 leu
.
th e s t a t e provl. d es lnrevenues.

Sometimes, though seldom,

General 1y, 1 oca1 unl. t s o f

government have only two possibilities with respect to tax exempt
property:

1.

increase rates on remaining taxable properties, or

-192.

exclude tax exempt uses.

The latter response may be possible as to

new tax exempt property; 67 it would be most difficult with respect to
property already located within the city.
Post

Serrano~

however, tax exempt property must be treated as if

it is not there when the contribution from non-local sources is computed, so as to equalize tax burdens.

It will no longer matter as much to

localities whether property is tax exempt.

While it still must be

serviced, the servicing costs may well be no different than for other
kinds of property.

It will matter to the state, for every exemption

granted will disproportionately lower local tax base, which must then
be equalized by some centralized funding.
The problem of providing funds to impacted areas will be shifted
to the states.
book,

While Alfred Balk does not analyze the data in his

68 he has fortunately included appendices containing the results

of his survey of university payments to local governments, federal
payments in lieu of taxes (PILT) statutes and programs, and PILT programs of states to capital cities of each state.

6o
~

A fair summary of

the appendices is that many universities make some payments to local
government in their area, 70 there are many federal PILT statutes which
authorize payments to states and localities and few states make any inlieu payments to their capital cities because of tax exempt state property
in the capital.
Post Serrano the following changes might occur:
1.

Since universities are no longer impacting local governments 71

but are only impacting the state, universities will resist making payments to localities.

Since almost all universities serve at least the

region and any impact is widely distributed, there is little compelling

-20about an argument, made with respect to university towns, that universities in fairness should
2.

mru~e

in-lieu payments to the state.

Since federal installations, public lands, public housing and

the like will no longer be impacting local governments, payments should
be made to the governments impacted, namely the states, or alternatively, to the extent federal property is reasonably evenly distributed
throughout the states, no particular state is impacted and federal payments should be ended.
3.

In effect, states will have to equalize the tax burdens in

capital city areas, as with other areas, so in effect, the state will
be paying in-lieu taxes to capital cities.

V.

Conclusion

The speculations in this article concerning the impact of the
Serrano principle on city planning, land values and use, it may confidently be predicted, do not constitute

an exhaustive list.

Some of the

speculations may be wrong, but surely the status quo will be altered in
the ways outlined or in other significant ways by application of the
Serrano principle.

At this time it is impossible to predict the full

development of the Serrano principle.

It may well be extended to other

local governments than school districts, to all types of locally raised
revenues and to equality measured by need rather than equal dollar
expenditures.

To the extent it is so extended, the radical alteration

of the status quo begun by the Serrano case will evolve to impacts of
near-revolutionary character.

,.
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